Suchergebnisse

The principal occupation of the Nixon Administration was an attempt to build what it called a "structure of peace." President Ford has made it perfectly clear that he agrees with the basic thrust of his predecessor's foreign policy. Public opinion polls show that a majority of the American ipeople share Ford's assessment of the Nixon Administration's alleged achievements in world affairs. I propose to challenge the basis on which they intend to build that structure and to pose an alternative basis. Before positing that alternative I will compare the Nixon-Kissinger grand design with other policies that compete for our allegiance today.

After almost a generation of cold war and bipolarity the international situation is said to have been transformed. We have entered the postwar era at last, an age characterized by multipolarity and the sober pursuit of national interests. America, Russia and China are assumed to have at last abandoned their crusading approach to world affairs. In the Moscow, Shanghai and San Clemente communiqués issued after Summit conferences in 1972 and 1973 these great nations "took the pledge" to exercise restraint, moderation and similar virtues. A war- and world-weary United States eagerly embraces a lower profile abroad, gratefully bidding goodbye to thirty years of globalism.

For a generation now, America has played a significant role in world affairs. Until Pearl Harbor a reluctant belligerent in World War II, this country was also slow to respond to the challenge of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of that gigantic conflict. But for almost twenty-five years American Presidents have been more or less guided by the policy of "containment." Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all introduced variations on the multiple themes of the policy adopted by Harry Truman. Yet each concluded that the world situation allowed no reasonable alternative to an activist American foreign policy in most areas of the globe.

The military utility of the limited Cambodian campaign should be clear to those capable of assessing the facts. It will help protect the withdrawal of American troops, and reduce the Communist capability to launch attacks in the southern half of South Vietnam. It will, in short, help the process of Vietnamization. On the other hand, the fate of the I.on Nol regime in Pnompenh remains in doubt. Should South Vietnam, and perhaps other countries in Southeast Asia, help the new Cambodian government after American withdrawal, it could withstand the efforts of Sihanouk. Hanoi et. al. The venture gained time at least to shore up the Lon Nol regime, while not assuring its survival. Nixon's expressed hope that the venture might prod Hanoi into serious negotiations can be dismissed in the light of North Vietnamese patience and determination.

Five years ago West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder launched a tentative "Opening to the East" which marked a break with Konrad Adenauer's relatively rigid approach to, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The "Grand Conbtion" of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats continued the experiment from 1966-1969. The Hallstein Doctrine—no diplomatic relations with any country which had such relations with East Germany (the Soviet Union being the sole exception)—was abandoned. West Germany established diplomatic relations with the maverick Rumanian regime, and re-established relations with Tito's Yugoslavia. Several trade and cultural exchange agreements were entered into with East European Communist nations.

Dean Acheson, President Truman's Secretary of State from 1949-1953, is generally considered to have been one of the ablest men to have held that position in the twentieth century. His memoirs recall the qualities of mind and the at times testy temperament which, together with the role he played in great events, made him also a very controversial Secretary. He did not suffer fools gladly, and was at times impatient and tactless with lesser mortals who failed to grasp what he considered to be elementary truths of world affairs. Although he has mellowed somewhat, he still believes that he was correct on all the great decisions in which he had his way, and the memoirs do not include a single significant case in which he acknowledges having been wrong.

In his classic Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville expressed doubt that this country would be able to conduct a wise foreign policy. He argued that democracies lack the qualities necessary for such a stance in world affairs. In his words, "… a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles." Through the second world war, many students of American foreign policy felt that de Tocqueville's pessimistic expectations had been proven valid. Since 1898, this nation seemed to oscillate between extremes of adventurous activism and sullen isolationism.